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 INTRODUCTION:  FEMINIST ADVOCACY, CONSTITUTIONS AND LAW  
 Penelope (Penny) Andrews
1
 
 
Feminist analysis is like friendship: an ongoing process of deepening complexity, 
interactive, contradictory, insightful, emotional, enlightening, challenging, 
conflicted.
2
 
 
The programs and projects of the last few decades of feminist advocacy have been 
applauded, resisted, and vilified.
3
   Despite these divergent responses, there is no doubt 
that in societies across the globe women’s voices in the legal and political realm are no 
longer muted.   Organizing and lobbying on all five continents, aided and abetted by the 
liberating possibilities of the innovative communications technology,  especially the 
internet, women advocates have created the discursive space in the political, legal, social, 
and economic realm to influence governmental policies, law and practice.   
Developments in the last few decades have illustrated the concerted efforts by women 
activists and scholars from across the globe to bring women’s issues from the margins of 
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political and legal discourse to a place where women’s concerns and priorities are at least 
recognized.
4
 
 
Feminism’s journey in the past few decades has been exciting, rancorous, emotional, and 
innovative.   The trajectory of feminist legal theory has mirrored these developments, 
embracing parallel and competing narratives of rights.    This has resulted in a rich and 
innovative body of legal theory that has forced the law to embrace the concerns of 
women.
5
 
 
A few decades back women in the Western democracies embarked on well-orchestrated 
campaigns to effect changes in the political and legal spheres.   The 1960’s and 1970’s 
witnessed the emergence of a groundswell of legal scholarship and activism, on the one 
hand  providing impetus for the emerging legal universe of equality and non-
discrimination, and on the other, responding to the policy and legal successes embodied 
in anti-discrimination laws and policies.
6
 
 
If one examines the legal systems of North America, the U.K., the European Union, or 
Australia, for example, the impact of feminist activism is apparent.   Feminist 
jurisprudence has unsettled the field of legal theory, transforming many areas of domestic 
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 3 
law and forcing the law to accommodate women’s experience.   A cursory glance at the 
areas of criminal law (particularly rape and domestic battery), family law, constitutional 
law, and tort law, reveals the impact of feminist jurisprudence.
7
   One also sees the 
impact of feminist legal theory in the areas of immigration and refugee law, for example, 
where the discrete experiences of women, for example as rape victims in war, or those 
subjected to government condoned private violence,  are increasingly seen as grounds for 
political asylum.
8
  Although the male bias in the law persists, the situation of women, 
particularly those in the middle and upper classes, has improved dramatically in the past 
few decades, and this change is a direct result of feminist law reform efforts.
9
 
 
But of course not all women have benefited in the same way – and indeed the twin 
processes of racism and poverty have rendered legal victories somewhat pyrrhic to a 
significant proportion of poor women and women of color.
10
   In addition, lesbian 
women, despite gains in some areas, perpetually remain subject to heterosexual 
orthodoxies that  marginalize their experiences.
11
   That is the situation too with women 
who suffer from mental and physical disabilities – their disabilities a stark contrast to 
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 4 
deeply ingrained notions of femininity.
12
   Overall though, the legal imagination and legal 
reality at least now formally embrace the notion of women’s equality, however disparate 
and unevenly implemented. 
 
Not satisfied with only local victories, Western feminists
13
 also began shifting their focus 
and directing their energies to challenging prevailing international legal theories and 
policies.   They targeted what they perceived as the male bias of international law and the 
major institutions of international law, especially the United Nations.   They demanded a 
more vigorous enforcement of international law, particularly human rights law, and also 
called for greater gender sensitivity at the United Nations.   They demanded a 
reorientation in United Nations enforcement mechanisms and procedures, and 
specifically challenged the organization to be more gender sensitive in its overall 
operation, including the appointment of women at middle and senior levels.
14
 
 
Although these global feminists purported, to a greater or lesser extent, to represent the 
world’s women,  the global reality reflects vast economic, geographical, cultural, and 
social differences between women,  particularly between those in the developed world 
and their counterparts in the developing world.     These differences are to be found 
within countries themselves, where economic disparities are apparent between local elites 
(mostly based in the urban centers) and poorer women (mostly residing in the rural 
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areas).    Despite this ontological unevenness, global women activists have pursued a 
collective mobilization of women against patriarchy and male domination in all its 
various guises.
15
  
 
Feminist activists, particularly those from the poorer countries involved in various 
nationalist struggles for independence or other democracy driven projects,  were also 
involved in strategically successful lobbying of the United Nations to ensure that the 
organization more vigorously pursues women's rights.
16
    They organized on a host of 
fronts, forming coalitions to amplify their efforts.    Women activists globally have 
energized the plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that continue to 
proliferate.   The individual and combined efforts and lobbying of these NGOs have 
forced governments to consider gender issues; these NGOs have "engendered" organs of 
civil society.   Examples of such activism abound:  for example, the major international 
human rights NG0s like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch all have 
significant programs that focus on women’s issues.   In addition, groups like Equality 
Now and Global Rights were established to focus entirely on women’s issues.  
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 6 
The result of much of this activism has meant that despite formidable obstacles to 
women's equality in a vast array of economic, social, and political areas, there now exists 
a highly organized, politically astute, articulate, and vocal group of  women activists who 
have committed themselves to eradicating the vestiges of sex discrimination and 
subordination, not only within their borders, but on a global scale.  
 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the importance of gender equality at the global level  
is reflected in its inclusion as one of the eight Millenium Development Goals (MDGs)  
endorsed in 2000 by every member nation of the United Nations as part of the Millenium 
Declaration.
17
    The Declaration calls on governments to “promote gender equality and 
empower women”.    Although the much awaited major review of the MDGs by world 
leaders in New York in September 2005 was rather disappointing, gender equality 
remains an important global goal.
18
   In addition, regional political entities have also 
incorporated gender equality as significant aspirational goals.   For example, the 
Declaration of the Southern African Development Community set a target of a minimum 
of 50% female representatives in office by 2015.
19
     The European Union too has 
endeavored to improve the conditions of European women in a host of areas.
20
   Across 
the globe dozens of feminist activists are now Cabinet Ministers, diplomats and high 
level political leaders.   The pursuit of gender equality is reflected in the four major 
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global documents and initiatives that have the possibility of transforming women’s lives.   
They are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), the Vienna Declaration on Violence Against Women, the Beijing 
Program and Platform for Action (including Beijing Plus Five and Beijing Plus Ten), and 
the United Nations Millenium Development Plan with gender equality as one of the 
goals. 
 
Feminist legal theorists have generated methodologies that provide scholars and 
advocates with a renewed approach to viewing the world and therefore to engage in 
strategies that may transform many institutions, particularly where they impact negatively 
on women’s equality.21   Feminist legal theorists insist on an exploration of  laws, 
policies and practices that center the experiences and concerns of women.   Indeed, 
feminist explorations have been likened to an “archaeological dig”.   Hilary 
Charlesworth, the Australian international lawyer, has elaborated that “there are various 
layers of practices, procedures, symbols, and assumptions to uncover and different tools 
and techniques may be relevant at each level”.22 
 
Feminist theoretical explorations therefore involve searching for the silences in and the 
omissions of the law; these often correlate with the distinct experiences of women. 
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Feminist legal theorists have insisted on removing what is seen as a false dichotomy 
between the public and the private sphere, arguing that private harms, frequently 
occurring to women,  be recognized as worthy of public opproprium and punishment.
23
   
These developments are most evident in the campaigns to outlaw marital rape, domestic 
battery and a call for mandatory arrests in cases of domestic violence.    For feminist legal 
theorists, the distinction between the private space, essentially that of women, and that 
which is deemed public, results in the demeaning of women’s status, roles and rewards in 
society at large.
24
   This is not however a settled question, since women advocates 
continue to differ about the appropriateness of the divide between the public and private.      
 
These differences surface frequently in contexts where women and their communities 
have experienced national authorities as oppressive and abusive, and where suspicion of 
the police and government authority is rife.   An example is the situation with Aboriginal 
women in Australia where despite widespread private violence against women (from 
their husbands and intimate partners) mandatory arrest policies appear particularly 
draconian in the face of documented deaths in police custody and other instances of 
maltreatment of Aborigines in the criminal justice system.
25
   Similarly, in South Africa, 
where suspicion of the police lingers in the face of extensive police abuse during 
apartheid, feminists insisting on removing the divide between the public and the private 
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as a practical matter remain difficult, even though the South African Constitution outlaws 
private violence against women.
26
 
 
Feminist legal theorists have worked consistently to challenge assumptions about 
femininity and masculinity.   They have insisted that law and its institutions and legal 
processes expose and redress the underlying societal assumptions and prejudices that 
bolster these categories and which perpetuate the subordination of, and discrimination 
against, women. 
 
Divergent and critical voices amongst feminist legal theorists have attempted to ensure 
that the feminist legal project be inclusive; that it is one that encourages and incorporates 
the many voices of women.     In this they have found common cause with women 
challenging racism and other forms of discrimination and who insist that these struggles 
intersect and engage with the struggle against sexism.   These “multi-racial” and “multi-
ethnic” voices  have insisted that the category  “woman”  be constantly challenged and 
also embrace other indicators of a women’s  identity, including class, race, sexual 
orientation, geography, religion, disability, and culture.
27
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For a feminist legal analysis, context is central to analyzing the situation of women in any 
given situation.   Critical feminist scholars, including third world feminists and feminists 
of color, have in their writing incorporated the cultural context as part of a deeper and 
more totalizing reality.
28
   They have argued that such reality be unfolded, layer by layer, 
with the express goal of gender equality.    In short, they have invited all women 
advocates to engage with the claims of culture as a parallel liberatory vision in which 
women’s sense of identity and longing cannot be extricated from their demands for 
equality.   Louise Halper, the late American legal scholar, makes this point thoughtfully 
in her analysis of the twin liberatory discourses of Islam and feminism in Iran.
29
   
Although recognizing the heavy burdens that women in Iran still bear as a consequence 
of the imposition of Islamic law after the Islamic revolution in 1979, she nevertheless 
traces how Iranian women have strategically engaged with the ruling class to pursue 
equality in education, access to employment and access to reproductive health care.    
Halper concludes that there is much currency in the idea that a specific “Islamic feminist” 
has emerged, with developments for women in Iran a key indicator of such feminism.
30
 
 
Feminist legal theorists have generated rich and innovative approaches to uncovering the 
many layers of female subordination in a variety of contexts.   Isabelle Gunning has 
boldly suggested that American feminists engage in “world traveling”, an empathetic and 
humble approach to analyzing the conditions of women considered as “other”.31   She 
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exhorts her feminist colleagues to recognize the context of women’s oppression 
elsewhere and to construct a transformative vision of equality that eschews degrading 
stereotypes about “civilized us” and “barbaric them”.32   Angela Harris has cautioned 
against a narrow essentialism that unquestioningly universalizes and homogenizes 
women’s experiences, without regard to other important markers of women’s identity like 
race and class.
33
    Taunya Banks,
34
  Leslye Obiora,
35
  Hope Lewis,
36
 and  Karima 
Bennoune
37
  have all argued for a contextual approach to equality that embodies the 
multifaceted aspects of women’s identities, recognizing that such identities are fluid, 
constantly evolving and at times contradictory.
38
 
 
Feminist legal theorists have also attacked the hierarchy of human rights, instead calling 
for an integrated approach to all layers of rights.   They insist that the divide between 
civil and political rights, the so-called first-generation rights, on the one hand, and 
economic, social and cultural rights, termed second-generation rights,  on the other,  be 
removed.
39
    They have argued forcefully, for example, that the right to free speech or 
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 12 
security deserves the same credence as the right to health, since both sets of rights are 
predicated on the existence of the other.    These second generation rights, in addition to 
third and fourth generation rights (group rights and women's rights, respectively), are not 
nearly as well integrated into the existing international instruments dealing with 
reporting, evaluation, and monitoring procedures of human rights violations.   But if 
women’s lives are to be altered, these deficiencies have to be addressed.  
 
The authors who have contributed to this volume explore some of the abovementioned 
issues in their respective articles.  
 
In the first article, Cyra Choudhury examines the lens through which liberal (Western) 
feminists tend to view Muslim men and women, and the reification of the dangerous and 
“violently patriarchal” Muslim male, on the one hand, and the subjugated and oppressed 
Muslim female, on the other.   Choudhury urges her liberal feminist colleagues to eschew 
the narratives of victimhood and rescue on behalf of Muslim women, and instead opt for 
a narrative that recognizes the interdependence of Muslim women to their families and 
communities.   They (Muslim women) are often forced to negotiate the liberatory 
possibilities of their religion, as well as their own demands for equality, in the face of 
marginalization and discrimination that Muslim communities experience in the post-9/11 
world.    Choudhury exhorts liberal feminists to pursue the goals of, and engage in, a  
partnership with Muslim women in the pursuit of gender justice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Forsythe ed. 2000) 75; see also Berta Hernandez-Truyol and Shelbi D. Day, Property, Wealth, Inequality 
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Turning her analysis to United States immigration law, Janet Calvo explores the 
citizenship of women as wives and their lack of protection under the Constitution as well 
as statutory law.  Calvo places the contemporary immigration system in its historical 
context, arguing that in fact today’s immigration laws regarding married women are 
shackled by historic legal decisions, and that despite changing cultural, political, and 
social norms, the law in this area has not evolved to provide the protections that women, 
especially married women, rightly deserve. 
 
In the third article of this volume, Fiona De Londras argues against a widely held 
interpretation regarding the implementation and enforcement of human rights, namely 
that international law is inferior,  and domestic (American) constitutional law, superior. 
Using the example of the pursuit of LGBT rights in Europe, through the European 
Convention on Human Rights, De Londras makes a compelling argument that American 
constitutional law and international law might have the capacity to develop a “synergistic 
relationship”, despite some fairly weighty obstacles. 
 
Highlighting the situation of women in Uganda, Donna Young explores the linkages 
between poverty, domestic violence and HIV/AIDS.    She argues that legal policies and 
programs to address each, requires a comprehensive response.   For example, legal 
attempts to stem domestic violence must also engage with lack of economic choices that 
women face.    In addition, attempts made to minimize the spread of HIV/AIDS amongst 
women need to acknowledge  that married women are particularly vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS infection because of domestic violence and their inability to negotiate safe sex 
 14 
practices.   This same vulnerability precludes them from insisting on sexual fidelity from 
their partners, or demanding economic resources on an equitable basis within the 
marriage.   Young acknowledges the limitations of the law in the face of these cultural 
and social impediments to gender equality, yet recognizes the power of the law to provide 
a structure and a language to pursue rights for women. 
 
Roberta Hirsch explores the possibilities of democracy and justice for Liberia with the 
election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first woman to be appointed as the President of an 
African nation.    In the wake of economic collapse and widespread trauma after fourteen 
years of civil war, Hirsch examines three areas that President Sirleaf has directed her 
administration’s efforts towards, and that has garnered widespread support from the 
international community.    These three areas are national development, including a 
commitment to gender equality and the eradication of violence against women, efforts to 
stamp out corruption, and endeavors towards national reconciliation.   Hirsch concludes 
that President Sirleaf is an appropriate person to lead the country at this historical 
juncture, as she possesses the requisite personal qualities and professional qualifications 
to lead, and she inspires confidence both within Liberia and internationally. 
 
In the concluding article in this volume, Susan Bazilli and Marilou McPhedran examine 
the strategies adopted by feminist advocates in Canada and South Africa to ensure that 
women’s right to equality were included in their respective constitutional frameworks.    
They provide a narrative about the strategies adopted by individual women and women’s 
organizations to ensure that lawmakers pay attention to their demands and respond 
 15 
accordingly.   Both authors were active participants in the Canadian constitutional 
debates in the 1980’s, and one, Susan Bazilli, was also involved in gender advocacy in 
the transitional period in  the South Africa before the adoption of a Bill of Rights in that 
county.  Bazilli and McPhedran tell the story of their involvement in these constitutional 
debates with passion, arguing that it was only the vigilance of women that ensured that 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the South African Bill of Rights 
incorporated the gender equality provisions for which both documents are admired 
globally. 
 
This volume is a modest contribution to the ongoing discourse around women’s rights 
and the place of law and constitutions in advancing those rights.  
 
Penelope (Penny) Andrews 
Valparaiso University School of Law and 
La Trobe University School of Law    
 
 
 
 
 
